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A Note on Prostitution: Victims Without Crime - Or
There's No Crime But The Victim Is Ideology
Elliott M. Abramson*
"The truth is that . . . the prostitute commonly likes her
work and would not change places with a shopgirl or waitress
for anything in the world."
H. L. Mencken
"Common prostitution is a miserable occupation in which
woman, exploited sexually and economically, subjected arbi-
trarily to the police . . . to the caprices of the customers, and
doomed to microbes and disease is truly abased to the level of
the thing."
Simone De Beauvoir, The Second Sex
THE ATTACK ON LAWS AGAINST PROSTITUTION
Recently, progressive, liberal thought has militated for a
"mature" perspective on prostitution' which would result in its de-
criminalization.' For example, the Victimless Crime project of the
* Professor of Law, Willamette University; A.B. Columbia University, 1960; J.D. Harvard
Law School, 1963.
1. If prostitution is defined as "the practice of indulging in promiscuous sexual activity
for money" (see WEBsTEas NEW COLLGITE DICTIONARY 926 (1973)) it will readily be appre-
ciated that there are many styles of attracting "clients," and various types of prostitutes.
Among them are street walkers who solicit passersby, employees of massage parlors who may
be asked by customers for specific sexual favors and who then provide them, "bar-girls" who
are available for pick-ups in bars and "call-girls" whose customers telephone for appoint-
ments at specified times and places. Although there are obvious differences in these life styles,
and although some are higher and some lower in the "professional" pecking order, for pur-
poses of the principal argument of this paper, the key uniting factor amongst them is the
promiscuous provision of sexual activity for money. However "elevated," the particular style
with which a practitioner goes about prostituting her (or him) self, the argument here is that
human degradation which can and should be redeemed, with the law's assistance, is taking
place.
2. Decriminalization may be taken to mean abolishing prostitution and related activities
from the proscription of the criminal law. What was previously defined as a criminal act no
longer is. This is distinguishable from "regulation" of prostitution, which also lifts the activ-
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Northern California Affiliate of the American Civil Liberties Union
favors decriminalization of sexual acts between consenting adults,
particularly in the case of prostitution. Similarly, the National Or-
ganization of Women is collaborating with the ACLU in working
toward decriminalization of prostitution. Even the American Bar
Association's Special Committee on Crime Prevention and Control,
chaired by Edward Bennett Williams, issued a 1972 report, "New
Perspectives on Urban Crime" recommending the decriminalization
of prostitution.' The commentaries in the Law Reviews have also
been critical of current laws, and law enforcement, seeking to re-
strain prostitution. They have aimed at dismantling criminal sanc-
tions currently applicable to many aspects of prostitutional activ-
ity.4
After a consideration of the rationale of such attacks, it will be
argued here that they are misguided and that the law should con-
tinue to operate toward the abolition of prostitution. The reasons
why it should and how it should go about doing so will be adum-
brated.
There are various arrows in the bow of those favoring the decri-
minalization approach. Some arguments against specific laws re-
strictive of prostitution are based on concrete constitutional law
arguments. We shall return to these later. Other arguments, which
turn out to be rather intimately related to some of the elements
ity itself from the criminal law's circle of prohibition, because regulation, rather than merely
permitting the activity to go on unmolested as, when, where and how it will, sets up norms
with which the activity is required to conform when it transpires. Thus regulation may involve
such mechanisms as licensing of prostitutes, required medical examinations at specified
times and places, inspection of brothels, and segregation of brothels in a particular section
of a city. Other approaches to prostitution are a) outright prohibition under the criminal law,
and b) the encouragement of abolition of the activity through the voluntary selection of
education, therapy, or other means by prostitutes. The major approaches are described in H.
BENJAMIN & R. MASTERS, PROSTITUTION AND MORALITY (1965). However, both decriminali-
zation and regulation remove the law from the business of dealing with the phenomenon of
prostitution, as such, and thereby endorse, by failure to bar it, the activity. The endorsement
may be thought to be stronger in the case of regulation, since in that case the law participates
in administering the activity. However, it is the attitude of endorsement itself which will be
critiqued in this paper, and for that purpose it is sufficient to refer to decriminalization as
prototypical of the attitude. Indeed, since it represents the weaker form of endorsement it is
the most challenging to the critique. If the latter carries in this context other species of the
attitude should be, simply, a fortiori cases.
3. Haft, Hustling For Rights, 1 Civ. LIB. REv. 8, 10 (1974).
4. See, e.g., Rosenbleet & Pariente, The Prostitution of the Criminal Law, 11 Am. CRIM.
L. REV. 373 (1973); Jennings, The Victim as Criminal: A Consideration of California's Prosti-
tution Law, 64 CAL. L. REV. 1235 (1976); Privacy and Prostitution: Constitutional Implica-
tions of State v. Pilcher, 63 IowA L. REv. 248 (1978).
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relied on in the constitutional analysis, commonsensically reflect
the "victimless crime" catch phrase of which prostitution is fre-
quently thought to be a prototypical example. They emphasize that
the actual transaction involving a prostitute and her5 client is a
consensual one as far as both parties are concerned. Each receives
from the other what is desired so that, in sharp contradistinction to
the great preponderance of situations addressed by the criminal law,
no one is hurt, disadvantaged, or victimized.
This analysis is the philosophical ally of a perspective which
might be called "pluralistic," or non-judgmental. It alludes to the
fact that people, including prostitutes, find satisfaction, accommo-
dation and adjustment to life in a multiplicity of modes. Then this
analysis suggests that society ought not pontificate about, and pro-
scribe, through its formal institutions such as law, some of these
ways, if they are not socially deleterious. Simply because some, or
even many, of society's members do not like such life styles, or even
regard them as "immoral," is claimed to be an insufficient and
misleading cause for trying to inhibit them. This type of viewpoint
is resonant in a passage such as the following:
Proponents of the nonmoral view recommend that the prob-
lem of prostitution be treated with scientific neglect . . . they
question whether private morals are proper concerns for public
law. According to this viewpoint, prostitution is a moral offense
which does not militate against the common good and should
therefore not be part of the criminal law.'
An alloyed approach which focuses sharply on prostitution as
merely one of many routine, day-to-day methodologies for confront-
ing life appears in a discussion by sexologist Albert Ellis in a 1951
issue of The International Journal of Sexology. He defines prostitu-
tion as "engaging in sexual relations for non-sexual and nonamative
considerations" and points out that such a definition embraces not
only women who sell sex for money by the hour, but also those who
trade sexual favors for such pay-offs as food, gifts and entertain-
ment. It also covers "wives who, having no love and no sex desire
5. The typical situation, almost to the point of exclusivity, in the mind's eye, is the one
involving the female prostitute and the male client. There are a variety of other situations,
such as the prostitute is male and the client of the same or opposite sex. For the sake of
convenience and simplicity, this paper will take the female prostitute-male client situation
as prototypical.
6. C. WINICK & P. KINsiE, THE LIVELY COMMERCE 14 (1971).
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for their husbands, continue to have sex relations in order to main-
tain the socio-economic benefits of marriage." Ellis points out that
his definition realistically covers all persons who exchange sexual
favors for non-sexual compensations and suggests that
anyone who engages in sex activities when he or she has no
sexual or amative desire for the partner . .. is hardly in an
enviable position. At the same time, I should also feel that
anyone who cooks, or manufactures shoes, or writes a book or
does any other kind of activity which he does not enjoy,' but for
which he derives other socio-economic gains, is also in an unen-
viable position, and ideally should certainly be looking for a
more enjoyable occupation. Since, in this rather grimly realis-
tic world in which we reside, we all tend to have to do many
things which we do not like to do, it is difficult to see why
prostituting ourselves sexually should be considered much
worse than our prostituting ourselves vocationally, artistically,
or otherwise.'
This intensely pragmatic view of prostitution, as merely one more
life coping mechanism, in turn breeds an offshoot position which
insists that perhaps because it is simply one amongst many garden
variety, non-injurious occupations, prostitution is not susceptible to
successful management by law enforcement. The English study en-
titled Report of The Committee on Homosexual Offenses And Pros-
titution, commonly known as the Wolfenden Report, put it this way:
Prostitution is a social fact deplorable in the eyes of moral-
ists, sociologists, and we believe, the great majority of ordinary
people. But it has persisted in many civilizations throughout
many centuries, and the failure of attempts to stamp it out by
repressive legislation shows that it cannot be eradicated
through the agency of the criminal law . ..there are enough
men who avail themselves of prostitutes to keep the trade alive.
It also remains true that there are those women who, even when
there is no economic need to do so, choose this form of liveli-
hood. For so long as these propositions continue to be true tlhere
will be prostitution, and no amount of legislation directed to-
ward its abolition will abolish it.'
7. H. BENJAMIN & R. MASTERS, supra note 2, at 24.
8. Quoted in Jennings, supra note 4, at 1254 n.113.
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Yet another argument in behalf of decriminalization asserts that,
whether or not prostitution is an ineradicable social phenomenon of
human society, in general, efforts to control prostitution in a con-
temporary, highly industralized and complex society simply do not
succeed. Difficulties in establishing probable cause for arrest, invei-
glement of police by bribe, or otherwise, into complicity with the
criminal activity, the taking advantage of crowded court calendars
by defendants' attorneys through repeated requests for continu-
ances, and plea bargaining are some of the practical obstructions to
effective enforcement
A tangent of this argument that, for practical reasons, prostitu-
tion is not well controlled by law enforcement is one which points
to how much is spent on current unsuccessful enforcement mecha-
nisms. For example, it has been estimated that San Francisco spent
more than $370,000 in 1967, incident to the arrests of 2,116 persons
on prostitution charges while, in 1973, Seattle spent more than $1
million dollars in efforts to control prostitution.10 This might be
called the misallocation of resources orientation. Aside from stress-
ing the ineffectuality of attempts to control, it objects to how much
it would cost to successfully restrict the practice of prostitution,
even if mechanisms to do so could be found, by emphasizing that
there are much more important social objectives on which to lavish
such expenditures.
THE FAILURE OF IDEOLOGY
While all of these arguments cutting in behalf of "legalizing"
prostitution are what I should like to call ideologically wanting, it
is perhaps this last rationale which most exemplifies the type of
ideological shallowness I have in mind. For this argument seems
quintessentially a technocratic-managerial one which omits vital
humanistic considerations. It speaks in terms of most efficiently
applying social resources, in terms of getting the heaviest return for
the public dollar, but insufficiently attends to certain crucial
human factors endemic to the situation and possibilities it purport-
edly analyzes. It announces that we are spending a great deal in
efforts to control prostitution but not succeeding very well, and
therefore suggests that we go on to the next problem and see what
9. Id. at 1254-58.
10. Id. at 1256.
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results the expenditures will produce there. It balances costs against
benefits, but it omits people. It simply treats as one other element
of analysis, if it heeds at all, the fact that giving up on prostitution
is giving up on prostitutes - and prostitutes are human beings.
Accepting prostitution by forsaking efforts to eliminate it is admit-
ting that many women will spend their lives in "the life," as prosti-
tutes refer to the mores of their existence.
This is an ideologically shallow approach because it relaxes the
strong moral cutting edge incorporated in the law's thrust towards
ameliorating human misfortune. It converts such misfortune, if it
even concedes that "the life" is a misfortune into, simply, one of the
many plural facts of life. Thereby it defaults on any responsibility
to correct and improve the women who are the victims of such
misfortune. It is essentially a regressive rather than a progressive
view because it regards the foibles of human nature as irredeemable
and sheds no tears for people who lie in the uncomfortable beds they
have made.
Also, in accepting the status quo of human misfortunes, it neg-
lects society's complicity in the origins of the misfortunes. In paying
pseudosophisticated attention to supposedly irreducible human di-
versities, it seeks smug immunization against critiques such as the
following:
"Social problems are not solved because people do not want to
solve them . . . . Solving social problems would necessitate a
change in the organizational mores from which they arise."
This realization should strengthen the conviction that prob-
lems of deviance are rooted in a great deal more than the char-
acteristics of deviating individuals."
It is of a quiescence which breeds inability to see what is before
one's very eyes and, therefore, the loss of faculty to make plain
commonsensical judgments. It marches as value-free complacency
in a sterile positivistic parade which equates each segment of experi-
ence with each other and protests that the most glaring differences
and inequities may not be measured. It will not permit description
of some things which happen to an individual as superior, others as
vastly inferior, some even as involving subjugation or exploitation.
[I]f there will always be prostitutes and clients, why shouldn't
11. E. SCHUR, CRIMES WIHouT VICTIMS 7-8 (1965) (footnote omitted).
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civilized people accept it? But a major issue about prostitution
is whether it serves a true social function, and whether fulfill-
ment of this function makes it impossible for prostitutes to
achieve any reasonable amount of human happiness. It could
be argued, for example, that slavery was functional in the
United States before the Civil War; yet however functional it
might have been, it clearly violated the slaves' humanity. Sim-
ilarly, the American dream of making equality meaningful for
all would clearly seem to be violated by segregating a group of
women whose primary work is meeting the sexual needs of men
on an anonymous cash basis. Respect for human beings and for
the ideal of giving every person an opportunity to achieve, in
John Dewey's phrase, the greatest quality as well as quantity
of experience, is clearly inconsistent with condoning prostitu-
tion.'"
The "ultrasophisticated," "pluralistic," "tolerant," "non-
judgmental" analysis which has been criticized here deafens itself
to such analyses and eschews truths as simple as "prostitution is
beyond doubt a social evil because it uses up women in a very rough
way." 3
12. WMIcK & Ki'sra, supra note 6, at 287.
13. Id. at 15-16. There are numerous and various sources which suggest that the contem-
porary "progressive" assessment of prostitution, which regards it as one of many life styles
in a democratic, plural society, represents glib inattentiveness to unfortunate objective condi-
tions which induce prostitutes to "choose" their life style.
Poor living conditions, unhealthy neighborhoods and neglected homes, inadequate
education, low levels of intelligence, ignorance of sexual matters or too early sex experi-
ence, and a whole combination of personal and environmental factors, many of which
are more likely to occur in the lower economic levels, are found in the backgrounds of
a great many prostitutes. The remarkable thing is not that women with such back-
grounds become prostitutes but that so many from the same background do not.
V. BULLOUGH, THE HISTORy OF PRosTrru'nON (1964). Jennings suggests that many women who
turn to prostitution do so after failing to meet some of society's "norms." They have had
difficulties in school, or on a job, or have fallen prey to "persistent social handicaps, such as
drug dependence, employment discrimination, culturally ingrained restrictions on career
choices available to women generally, or desertion by a man who might have supported them.
Women who thus find themselves inadequately prepared to . . . [support] themselves may
choose prostitution as their means of support." Jennings, supra note 4, at 1252-53.
Dr. Harold Greenwald found psychoanalytic congruences in the backgrounds of prostitutes.
Questioning of a prostitute often produced a profile of
the intense early feeling of deprivation because of rejection by the mother, the feeling
that the mother did not want to nurture them, feed them, take care of them . . .
[Firequently [this lack of early nurture] seemed to arise from the fact that the
mothers were inadequate individuals, immature and unable to give their daughters the
love they needed . ...
1978-79
Duquesne Law Review
The short-sightedness of removing the normative power of the law
as a constraint upon prostitution and, therefore, as a pinion in ef-
forts to correct its concomitant evils is reflected in ambivalences
expressed in the Wolfenden Report." This document avers that:
there are limits to the degree of discouragement which the
criminal law can properly exercise towards a woman who has
deliberately decided to live her life in this way . . .
[P]rostitution is an evil of which any society which claims to
be civilized should seek to rid itself; but this end could be
achieved only through measures directed to a better under-
standing of the nature and obligation of sexual relationships
and to a raising of the social and moral outlook of society as a
whole .. .. But until education and the moral sense of the
community bring about a change of attitude towards the fact
of prostitution, the law by itself cannot do so.'"
An immediate rejoinder to this assertion should ask why the law
should not contribute to bringing about "a change of attitude to-
wards . . . prostitution" simply because "by itself [it] cannot do
so." This seems tantamount to suggesting that if a person is incapa-
When the girls found their mothers inadequate they tunred to fathers or father
substitutes, hoping that they would compensate for what the mother had not supplied.
• . . [Wihat the girls were seeking from their fathers and later from men in general
was not so much sex as actual nurture, feeding and being taken care of.
H. GRENwALD, THE CALL GnuL 92-93 (1958).
Greenwald also points to an amazing uniformity respecting the family 'atmospheres of his
subjects' childhood. "I found not one example of a permanent, well-adjusted marital relation-
ship between the parents. Not one . . . reported growing up in a happy home where her
parents got along well together." Id. at 107.
Greenwald also reports a pattern of early rewarded sex. "They discovered at an early age
that they could get some measure of affection, of interest, by giving sexual gratification." Id.
at 109.
A strong protest against the complacency and irresponsibility of lapsing legal strictures
against a basically undesirable phenomenon, such as prostitution, is expressed from a special
perspective by Susan Brownmiller.
[M]y horror at the idea of legalized prostitution is -not that it institutionalizes the
concept that it is a man's monetary right, if not his divine right, to gain access to the
female body, and that sex is a female service that should not be denied the civilized
male. Perpetuation of the concept that the "powerful male impulse" must be satisfied
with immediacy by a cooperative class of women, set aside and . . . licensed for this
purpose, is part and parcel of the mass psychology of rape.
S. BROWNUILLEx, AGAINST OuR WILL 392 (1975).
14. THE DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON HoMosExuAL OFFENsES AND PROSTITUTION, THE
WOELNDEN REPORT (1963) [hereinafter cited as THE WOLFENDEN REPORT].
15. Id. at 132-33.
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ble of doing a job entirely alone, he ought to offer no help at all to
someone else working at it. Why should the exemplary power of the
law not continue to make a statement as part of the chorus of ideals
intent on "raising . . . the social and moral outlook of society as a
whole?"
The irresponsibility and sluggishness of a position which so en-
dorses the relaxation of legal judgment is put into high relief later
in the Wolfenden Report when proposals to bring brothels under
state administration and regulation are discussed. For there,, al-
though acknowledging that "[W]e have already expressed our view
that prostitution can be eradicated only through measures directed
to a better understanding of the nature and obligations of sex rela-
tionships and to a raising of the social and moral outlook of society
as a whole," the report goes on to say that "[tihe licensing and
toleration of brothels by the State would make nonsense of such
measures, for it would imply that the State recognized prostitution
as a social necessity.'
6
While a distinction can be drawn between the law simply not
dealing with a phenomenon (decriminalization) and establishing
positive guidelines with which the phenomenon must comply
(legislation-regulation), it seems that in each instance the law is
legitimating an admitted evil.
LAW As CRITICAL THEORY
I would like to denominate the view for which I have been implic-
itly arguing, the "Critical Theory" perspective on law. The theory
suggests that if prostitution is acknowledged as an undesirable
phenomenon and experience, the law ought to continue to judge and
proscribe it as illegal. The label is derived from the work done by
scholars and critics at the Frankfurt School and the Institute of
Social Research-especially those monumental figures in twentieth
century social criticism, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer.'7
The notion is both organic and activist. It denies a separation
between abstract scientific theorizing and taxonomic formulations,
on the one hand, and the practical procedures of living a decent life
16. Id. at 158.
17. See R. BERNSTEIN, THE RESTRUCTURING OF SOCIAL AND PoLmCAL THEORY (Ist ed. 1976)
for reference to Horkheimer's essay, Traditional and Critical Theory as "virtually . . . a
position paper for the Frankfurt thinkers." Id. at 179-85. See M. JAY, THE DIALECTICAL
IMAGINATION (1st ed. 1973), for a history of the Frankfurt School itself.
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on the other. It scoffs at the idea of "value-free" objective inquiry
of scientific purity and insists that all inquiry is from a particular
orientation, and consequently grinds the axe of the perspective from
which it comes.
The practical thrust of critical theory is characterized by Richard
Bernstein, thusly:
Critical theory has a fundamental practical interest that guides
it - a practical interest in radically "improving human exist-
ence," of fostering the type of self-consciousness and under-
standing of existing social and political conditions so that
"mankind will for the first time be a conscious subject and
actively determine its own way of life."' 8
The close relationship between the ruminations of theory and the
rumblings of purposeful political and social activity to improve the
human condition and the procreative power of thought to breed
significant advance in man's life structures, is traced back by Bern-
stein to the intimate connection which existed between "theoria"
and "praxis" for Aristotle. He viewed the one as suggesting the
concrete form which should be taken by the "truly human activity
manifested in the life of the polis. "19
Perhaps the distinguishing hallmark of Critical Theory is its ex-
plicit recognition that knowledge and interest are inextricably con-
nected. 0 The human activity of theorization is in behalf of humans
living a free life - in the deepest sense of that term. A person is
freest to be himself in a life in which each person achieves maximum
personal development and becomes the most and best of what he
has the capacity to become.
A reverence for these possibilities is forsaken by the proponents
of decriminalization of prostitution. In rushing to embrace
"realism," and "pluralism," they ignore a tradition which insists
that there are objective levels of attainment rational persons can
reach under appropriate environmental conditions or, perhaps more
precisely, given the absence of particular concrete influences. This
is a powerful philosophic lineage derived from such synoptic and
penetrating eighteenth century thinkers as Kant and Rousseau. It
18. R. BERNSTEIN, supra note 17, at 180-81.
19. R. BERNSTEIN, PRAxIs AND ACTION xi (1971).
20. R. BERNSTEIN, supra note 17, at 180.
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was further developed and shaped by Marx and his followers.2
Although it is a strain of thought which has often been deeply
submerged in the faddish force of pragmatic, technocratic currents,
it has never been entirely drowned and has always resurfaced as an
ideal of dynamic vitality. This tradition is unskeptical in its affir-
mations of mankind's possibilities. It proclaims tremendous prom-
ise in man as a rational creature, as a being who, if he lived out the
most simple, fundamental signals of his rational character, would
achieve highly beneficient and satisfactory experience. It purports
to have knowledge of values through its true knowledge of this
human nature.22 The frustration of such nobility of achievement and
existence is accounted for by societal and institutional accretions
which warp and distort the true nature of man into bastardized
versions of what human conduct, optimally, might be. The most
popular and renowned expression of this sentiment may be Rous-
seau's expostulation, at the beginning of the Social Contract that
"Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains. ' '1 3 (Perhaps the
most extreme manifesto of this faith is Trotsky's edict: "Every man
21. For example, consider the following explication of Rousseau's position in his Second
Discourse, the Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality.
He argues that man, living according to purely natural impulsions outside of society, was
essentially a stupid but peaceful animal. Hobbes was wrong in supposing a natural state of
war among men.
Hobbes' error, according to Rousseau, was that he imputed to natural man a number of
qualities-foresight, pride, and fear of violent death-which are the product of society and
not of nature. Man in the state of nature was not a "wicked child," but a "good" animal who
never harmed another unless his own preservation was at stake.
See J. RoussEAu, THE FIRST AND SECOND DiSCOURSES (R. Masters ed. 1964).
Also, in SocuLasM: ScIENmIc AND UTOPIAN, Engels wrote of man controlling material condi-
tions, rather than being subjugated to and controlled by them, when he celebrated the coming
of that day when man would ascend from the "kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of
freedom". II MAN IN Co r EMPoRAY SocIETY 289 (1955).
22. A precis of Kant's endorsement of values as objectively knowable can be found in 2
W. JONES, A HISTORY OF WEsTERN PHiLosopHy 847-48 (1952).
23. As a shrewd commentator has noted, for utopian oriented thinkers such as Rousseau
Utopia is an attack on both the doctrine of natural sin, which imposes rigid limits
on men's social potentialities, and on all actual societies, which always fall so short of
men's real capacities ....
[Rousseau] knew that suffering was not necessary since he "had discovered that the
source of all men's miseries and wickedness was in their false opinions .... "
• . . freedom . . . means that there are no set limits to what [man] can do with and
to himself. What he does is to abuse his powers and to make himself miserable.
J. RoussEAu, THE SociAL CoN rAcT Oa PwimCnS OF OLmCAL RIGHT 5 (C. Sherover ed. 1974).
Judith N. Shklar insists that Rousseau, himself, did not think men would achieve Utopia.
But this does not discount the power of his vision to move men toward its practical attain-
ment. J. SHCLAR, MEN AND CmZENs, A STUDY OF ROussEAu's SocIAL THEORY 2,3,10 (1969).
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an Aristotle," once society's institutions are appropriately arranged.
One need not endorse such almost hysterical optimism in the ability
of all to achieve supra-magnificently to, nevertheless, find a great
power and attraction in the mentioned tradition).
It is essentially a utopian vision for it suggests that people are
capable of being much more than they in fact may be at any given
historical time and place and teaches that a correct structuring of
their environment and institutions will move them toward attain-
ment of much superior objective possibilities. It is idealistic because
it discounts the pedestrian character of what is in behalf of moving
toward the grandeur of what may be if we make it so.
This chiliastic thrust can be seen as highly discordant with the
pluralistic managerial mentality which accepts, as an immutable
given, the human misfortune of considerable prostitution and seeks
from there to minimize the costs and maximize the benefits of ad-
ministrating it as a personal and social given. 4 This skeptical
"realistic" managerial approach disembowels the law's normative
thrust toward human "perfectibility," as envisioned in Utopian
dreams, when it urges decriminalization of prostitution and offers
dispensation for society to ignore human degradation, misfortune
and misery.
Decriminalization is subversive of the Critical Theory elements
served by the law. It eviscerates the law as an ensign of human
aspiration, as a reflection of what it might just be possible for the
human experience to achieve if we refuse to default. It ignores the
idealistic character of law and treats it simply as an institutional
"value-free" arrangement concerned solely with managing compet-
ing particularistic and selfish interests so that they interact with
minimum dissonance.
In other words, the rather narrow, unaspiring mind set I have
associated with the decriminalization proponents may be said to
overlook the "emancipatory" function of law and legal institutions
and processes. This emancipatory component is suggested by work
done by perhaps the foremost of the contemporary descendants of
the Frankfurt School tradition of Critical Theory, Jurgen Haber-
mas. Habermas, in Knowledge And Interest, (this title itself sug-
24. Daniel Bell writes of the exhaustion of passions for utopia in the 50's, a period which
might also be thought of as the origin of the surge toward the full blown managerialism which
dominates our lives today. D. BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY 404 (1962). He also mentions fervor
for improvement as a characteristic of ideologies. Id. at 402.
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gests Critical Theory's view that there is a most intimate relation-
ship between intellectual theorizing and practical moves toward
human betterment, between theory and liberation) identifies what
he considers to be three primary cognitive interests - the technical,
practical and emancipatory. He claims that to each of these three
basic cognitive interests there corresponds a science or discipline.
"The approach of the empirical-analytic sciences incorporates a
technical cognitive interest; that of the historical hermeneutics sci-
ences incorporates a practical one; and the approach of critically
oriented sciences incorporates the emancipatory cognitive inter-
est."2
It seems not too inapposite to ask that Law, vis a' vis this frame-
work, be considered a critically oriented science. Indeed, it would
seem to be of such character insofar as its prescriptions wear a
normative badge and it represents a proclamation of those arrange-
ments which will maximize the quality of human society. It should
therefore, according to Habermas' schema, incorporate an
"emancipatory cognitive interest." It should employ its knowledge
about how institutions ought to be arranged to free individuals. But
proposals for decriminalization cut against emancipation of prosti-
tutes and accept their indefinite bondage to "the life." The law,
rather than standing for and endeavoring to bring about the freeing
of currently trapped individuals for attainment of superior poten-
tials, which utopian thought claims as objectively realizable, is con-
verted to spiritless concession administering to the unfortunate, but
inevitable, seams of reality.
CRITICAL THEORY DISTINGUSHED FROM THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS
TO PRESERVE SOCIETY
What I have called the Critical Theory approach must be sharply
distinguished from another species of anti-decriminalization argu-
ment, which takes the line that society is entitled to enforce its
morals, through its laws and legal institutions, as a means of pre-
serving and perpetuating itself and its values. This latter argument
emphasizes protecting predominant social institutions, as they
exist, from insidious influences which might induce the unraveling
of the fabric incorporating the status quo's ethos. Contrarily, the
Critical Theory perspective accentuates positively redeeming
25. R. BEaNsrIN, supra note 17, at 192.
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individuals currently caught in the miserable toils of undesirable
social processes. The approach urging enforcement of morals, as
guarantor of society, focuses on protecting society and its prevalent
values from the impact of certain individuals pursuing certain activ-
ities, but the critical theorist seeks to employ the law as an active
instrument by which to integrate beset individuals into the gener-
ally benign social matrix so that they can realize their richest poten-
tials.
The acute emphasis on society's stake in protecting itself and its
own belief-systems, endemic to the enforcement of morals ap-
proach, is elegantly and clearly stated in Lord Patrick Devlin's
work, appropriately entitled The Enforcement of Morals."6
Society is entitled by means of its laws to protect itself from
dangers, whether from within or without. . . the political par-
allel is legitimate. The law of treason is directed against aiding
the king's enemies and against sedition from within. The justi-
fication for this is that established government is necessary for
the existence of society and therefore its safety against violent
overthrow must be secured. But an established morality is as
necessary as good government to the welfare of society. Socie-
ties disintegrate from within more frequently than they are
broken up by external pressures. There is disintegration when
no common morality is observed and history shows that the
loosening of moral bonds is often the first stage of disintegra-
tion, so that society is justified in taking the same steps to
preserve its moral code as it does to preserve its government
and other essential institutions. The suppression of vice is as
much the law's business as the suppression of subversive activi-
ties; it is no more possible to define a sphere of private morality
than it is to define one of public subversive activity.27
The law should uphold society's moral judgments because their
degradation is psychological treason, as subversive of the existing
order in its own way as physically treasonable activities are in an-
other. In Devlin's view a society which wishes to endure as it is must
as vigorously check the one deviation as the other:
Society cannot live without morals. Its morals are standards
of conduct which the reasonable man approves . . . . [A man
26. P. DEvLN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MoRALs (1968).
27. Id. at 13-14.
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may] not share in the common morality; but that should not
make him deny it is a social necessity. A rebel may be rational
in thinking that he is right but he is irrational if he thinks that
society can leave him free to rebel.2
In discussing the Critical Theory approach, reference was made
to the "emancipatory" energy which could be generated by the law's
normative dimension - its thrusting force to liberate individuals to
maximum fulfillment. The lack of interest of the enforcement of
morals approach in so freeing personalities to best realize them-
selves, its obsession with maintaining the order which freezes the
overall status quo, is exemplified in a typical taxonomy of the ra-
tionale for using the criminal law to inhibit and control immoral
behavior. There are four components or claims embedded in this
schema, four reasons why the immoral behavior should be pro-
scribed by the criminal law:
a) the activity in question has serious and deleterious effects
upon individuals and upon the society in general;
b) a cure can be effected;
c) there is a societal consensus that the activity ought to be
forbidden; and
d) deterrence of the forbidden activity.29
This structure can be seen as heavily biased toward society's in-
terests and relatively unconcerned with the redemption of individu-
als who might actually be engaged in the undesirable activity. It
chiefly aims at protecting society from conduct generated by offend-
ing individuals rather than at rescuing such individuals from in-
volvement in the offensive conduct. Even with regard to the second
component, the coloration seems to suggest that the prime virtue of
curing the individual is to forestall further annoyance to society.
Salvation of the former offender seems secondary. Only by reference
to serious and deleterious effects upon individuals does this struc-
ture seem to focus on improvement of the individual for its own
sake, (But even here some of the individuals referred to must be the
innocent who might be injured by the perpetuation of the activity
in question). Even then, this language is immediately followed by
"and upon the society in general" thereby refocusing the eye on the
real ball, as far as the objectives of the criminal law are concerned.
28. Id. at 24-25.
29. This particular formulation appears in Skolnick, Coercion to Virtue: The Enforcement
of Morals, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 588, 593-94 (1968).
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The priority of enforcement of morals is society; that of Critical
Theory the individual in society.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM
As earlier mentioned, some of the decriminalization arguments
are derived from a constitutional law analysis of statutory prohibi-
tions on prostitution .3 The principal orientation of this paper is not
consonant with an exhaustive examination of these constitutional
analyses for the purpose of trying to refute their assertions that
many current anti-prostitution laws may be unconstitutional. How-
ever, a brief consideration of some of the more trenchant constitu-
tional challenges seems warranted, if only to show that such argu-
ments are certainly not of overwhelming and dispositive power. This
discussion will also reveal the very short shrift that is generally
given by decriminalization proponents to the possibility of redeem-
ing individual human lives.
One of the most prototypical of the constitutional arguments is
one based on Supreme Court cases, such as Griswold v.
Connecticut3' and Eisenstadt v. Baird,32 which established a "right
of privacy" regarding sexual matters. Roe v. Wade3 is a relatively
recent addition to the arsenal and is seen by those advancing such
a position as embellishing the area of sexual privacy with a "right
to a certain scope of personal autonomy." '34
It is maintained that the "Supreme Court's analysis of the right
to privacy . . . includes two related aspects: the right to carry on
• . . sex-related activities in seclusion," as well as the right to the
just mentioned "scope of personal autonomy," and that
"prostitution is a good example of confluence of these two aspects
of privacy." It is further claimed that "[t]he private sexual act
involved in prostitution is no less a personal right for being commer-
cial."3 However, the argument is concluded, perforce, with ac-
knowledgment that the privacy interest is not absolute, or a categor-
30. See, e.g., Rosenbleet & Pariente, supra, note 4; Haft, supra note 3; and Privacy and
Prostitution: Constitutional Implications of State v. Pilcher, supra note 4.
31. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
32. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
33. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
34. Privacy and Prostitution: Constitutional Implications of State v. Pilcher, supra note
4, at 265.
35. Id.
36. Haft, supra note 3, at 16.
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ical imperative. "Therefore, the government should not be able to
prohibit it [prostitution] unless the state can meet the very heavy
burden of proof that banning it is beneficial to society."37
The same concession to the indubitable right of the government
to invade the sacrosanct perimeter of privacy, if it can carry that
heavy burden of demonstrating that its encroachment is beneficial
to society, is granted in the following contention:
All of the statutes and ordinances which either directly or
indirectly make prostitution punishable under the criminal law
are prime targets for raising a privacy argument. The thrust of
the attack is that in making prostitution illegal the state is
invading an individual's zone of privacy: the right to control
the use and function of his or her body without unreasonable
interference from the state.3
The last phrase, of course, admits that if any anti-prostitution stat-
ute can be deemed to be reasonable interference with the right of
privacy, it is immune from constitutional evisceration.
But this barrier is not at all, as such proponents of decriminali-
zation seek to insinuate, prohibitive or impassable. It is of the ess-
ence of reasonability to have laws aimed at redeeming human lives
from despair and motivating them towards fulfillment; it is mani-
fest that such laws are very "beneficial to society." It is quientessen-
tially reasonable-and most assuredly not "unreasonable interfer-
ence"- to seek to cultivate people's lives in accordance with their
most noble capacities as beings of reason.
Is it any more "unreasonably" intrusive to seek to protect people
from the self-inflicted torments and privations of a life of prostitu-
tion than it is to try to protect them from perversely ingesting adul-
terated food which could make them seriously ill or kill them? Sup-
pose it were suggested that as long as foods were clearly labeled as
containing ingredients which could seriously impair the health of
individuals, such foods should be allowed to be sold to the public,
since a law prohibiting the sale of foods so marked, illegitimately
interdicts the private rights of individuals who, in full awareness of
what they are doing, want to eat such food. It could be asserted that
occluding the opportunity of individuals who want to so treat their
own bodies from doing so is unsupportable meddling with their
37. Id.
38. Rosenbleet & Pariente, supra note 4, at 411.
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autonomous rights respecting their own bodies. It can no longer be
seriously thought that such arguments would prevail against the
state's judgment that such individuals must be protected from their
own instincts to destroy themselves. A judgment by the state that
such individuals can do better and are engaging in such self-
destructive activity only because of having been victimized by
objectively unfortunate conditions and influences, would certainly
be sustained against constitutional challenges based on rights of
privacy and correlative ones of personal autonomy. If so, why should
analogous judgments articulated in terms of laws seeking to save
prostitutes from their emotionally crippling existences be consid-
ered any more vulnerable to constitutional attacks of that nature.
Perhaps those firing the constitutional fusillades at anti-
prostitution laws cast their arguments so assuredly through a failure
to even conceptualize the rationale of human redemption which
may be conceived as inspiring legal efforts to control prostitution.
For example, consider the interests on behalf of state interference
which Rosenbleet and Pariente feel they must confute in arguing
that prohibiting prostitution is an unconstitutional, because unrea-
sonable, encroachment on areas of personal privacy.
The logical question then follows. What is the state interest
in placing statutory restrictions on prostitution? Several possi-
bilities exist: (1) The claim that prostitution is the cause of
great increases in venereal disease; (2) An alleged link between
prostitution and organized crime; (3) The theory that prostitu-
tion is in some way connected to other crime-related activities
and is a significant factor in increasing such crimes as robbery,
assault, and narcotic possession and sale; and (4) the notion
that street-walkers offend public decency and that the regula-
tion of immorality is necessary to safeguard the general wel-
fare. All of these possibilities fall short of providing a particular
and specific interest which is compelling enough to permit the
state to encroach upon personal liberty and invade an individ-
ual's zone of privacy.3"
Such commentators feel that if they can demonstrate the false
assumptions entwined in these interests by showing that such pur-
ported objectives will not in fact be attained by enforcement of laws
against prostitution, they have made out the unreasonability of
39. Id. at 416-17.
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such laws' commands to individuals leading their private lives. But
as is evident from the just quoted material, the rationale put for-
ward here, which justifies the effort to control prostitution as a
project to redeem people from their own misguided instincts and to
lead them toward the richer experience it is believed they can at-
tain, is not even considered as reflecting a germane state interest
which must be addressed.
Once such a state concern must be confronted as a salient objec-
tive of legal efforts to restrict prostitution, the constitutional impe-
diments sought to be raised to inhibit such efforts at control become
much less formidable. Indeed, as suggested above, they dissolve.
WHAT SHOULD LAWS "CRIMINALIZING" PROSTITUTION PROVIDE?
If there should continue to be laws against prostitution, what
disposition should be provided for their violation? More precisely,
what disposition for violation should be provided consistent with the
rationale, argued in the foregoing, that prostitution should continue
to be treated as illegal activity toward the end of saving prostitutes
from themselves and guiding them to more fulfilling life styles and
experiences?
Clearly, from what has been said, punishing prostitutes either for
punishment's sake or as a means of deterrence cannot be thought
of as useful in moving toward the redemptive goal. Retribution for
falling prey to misfortune is irrational. And the timeless persistence
of prostitution, in the face of long and many efforts to outlaw it,
belies the effectiveness of orthodox structures of deterrence. Simi-
larly, simply incarcerating someone for a given period of time with-
out dealing with the factors which motivated the person to be a
prostitute does nothing to discourage the person from resuming
prostitution activities. "Most were back working the streets soon
after they were released . . . . One of the primary reasons the laws
don't work is that putting a criminal label on prostitutes and locking
them up does not eliminate the reasons for prostitution."10
In any event, ample evidence incontrovertibly demonstrates that,
because of the administrative realities of the criminal courts system,
most arrested prostitutes spend very little time in "protective" cus-
tody. "Once arrested, a prostitute arranges bail and returns to the
streets within a day . . Crowded court calendars also lead to
40. Haft, supra note 3, at 14.
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extensive use of plea bargains, resulting in light sentences. By re-
peatedly requesting continuances, a prostitute's attorney may get
her case dismissed for lack of witness testimony or may secure a
better plea bargain.""
The only rationale for stretching the arm of the criminal law to
embrace prostitutes is the rehabilitative one.42 The law should con-
tinue to proscribe prostitution in order to express the authority nec-
essary to compel prostitutes to avail themselves of state provided
services and experiences commended. This is the right spirit-but
with insufficient fervor. If prostitution is the result of the kind of
fundamental, deep-seated syndromes which occasion people to have
such a self-deprecatory and distorted a view of themselves that they
spend their lives much less satisfyingly, much more masochistically,
than they might, motivation toward "the life" will not be extirpated
by such cursory or superficial means. 3 If the root goes deep, so must
the therapy be radical, penetrating and comprehensive. If we wish
to change a woman from a prostitute into someone who believes she
can, and is entitled to be, a productive, respected, fulfilled and
even, hopefully, happy member of society it will not do to have her
speak to a social worker once or twice and let it go at that-with a
smug feeling of having tried. To authentically transform her self-
image and eradicate the objective conditions which propelled her
toward prostitution may well require substantial resources. Psy-
chotherapy, medical attention, job training, exposure to minimal
general education experiences, and child support payments are but
some of the services which might need to be provided in redirecting
a single prostitute from "the life" to life. 4
This is obviously not the forum to prescribe, in exhaustive detail,
a redemptive program. A great deal of varied and specialized profes-
sional expertise is presumably necessary to spell out particular de-
tails. But is is important to recognize that the same law which has
the power to apprehend and convict prostitutes should also provide
them with significant and intelligently targeted services so that
there is a reasonable chance for such persons to leave prostitution
behind.
41. Jennings, supra note 4, at 1258.
42. See note 45 and accompanying text infra.
43. See notes 11-16 and accompanying text supra.
44. See notes 50-52 and accompanying text infra.
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SPECULATION ON RATIONAL AND INCORRIGIBLE REASONS FOR
PROSTITUTION
It is perhaps necessary, in a paper urging that the law continue
to address prostitution with the aim of rehabilitating its practition-
ers, to consider arguments that such rehabilitative efforts are un-
wise and misdirected because prostitution is a very rational and
sensible choice for some women to make, and because prostitution's
existence results in greater social benefits than it does liabilities.
One of the powerful arguments in behalf of the rationality and
sensibleness of choosing prostitution as a means of earning a living
is a straightforward economic one. It points out that the high priced
call girl earns from "the life" a financial remuneration far beyond
what she could in any other form of work for which she could possi-
bly qualify. Therefore, it is highly logical for such a woman to choose
to be a prostitute insofar as she is a rational economic animal. 5
This conclusion serves but to validate the contention that people
will subjugate and demean themselves as abyssmally as "the life"
requires only in response to specifiable objective conditions of the
environment. It makes sense to be a prostitute in order to earn the
most money only in an atmosphere in which the economically ra-
tional aspect of personhood has been stimulated to obsessive propor-
tions. If we lived in a society in which a person's self-image were not
so frequently made contingent on a bank balance, would people so
single-mindedly seek to maximize their economic position at the
expense of other aspects of their personalities?
In other words, does not the "it's economically rational to be a
prostitute" argument confirm what was earlier said about prostitu-
tion very often being ascribable to particular social conditions? Does
not it conform with the utopian confidence in a human nature which
aspires to, and is capable of experiencing, "higher" levels of exist-
ence if the influences dragging it lower are removed or effectively
counteracted? This "rational economics" argument brings prostitu-
tion into relief as a social disease as well as a personal one, and
serves to reinforce the assertion that people would not be prostitutes
if not forced to it. If materialism were not a thread in almost every
aspect of this society's fabric, and if more decent jobs paying decent
45. Gail Sheehy in her book on "the life," HUSTLMG, estimates that prostitution is a $10
billion dollar business in the United States, with some full-time prostitutes earning as much
as $70,000 annually (as cited in Bode, New Life For the Oldest Profession, THE NEw REPutuC
23 (July 8, 1978)).
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wages existed, prostitution as a job might seem a much less
"rational" choice than it now does. There is evidence that the effort
to eradicate prostitution in mainland China has been successful."6
Is this sharp testimony to the effect that when the image of man as
hominus economicus is decelerated prostitution becomes much less
of a feasible alternative to many potential practitioners?
While the "rational economics" justification for prostitution may
induce pessimism about immediate efforts to obliterate it in the
sense that it is not reasonable to expect a rapid and radical transfor-
mation of this country's economic system and environment, its up-
beat message may be that prostitution is not an irreducible expres-
sion of personalities. If becoming a prostitute may, at least in part,
be contingent on mutable economic circumstances rather than an
inexorable product of irrepressible impulses, there is incentive to
persist in applying influences such as the law, which can counteract
and dilute transitory forces motivating the unfortunate to become
prostitutes.
However, an argument can be made that proclivities toward pros-
titution are ineradicable in at least some practitioners because some
persons are, possibly genetically destined to be prostitutes just as
others are endowed with and impelled to express artistic gifts. This
argument seems spurious, however, insofar as prostitution is defined
as the provision of sexual services in return for compensation. The
compensation angle distinguishes it from promiscuity because
promiscuity alone suggests choice of partners by the person being
promiscuous. Such a person engages in promiscuous sex for the sake
of the sex, or even perhaps for the sake of cumulating promiscuous
sex, but not for the sake of a sale. It is much easier to conceive of
such volitional promiscuity as determined by something in the na-
ture of a genetic code than it is to conceive of a genetic urge to be
promiscuous for money. Genes may well "know" or "be aware" that
people other than the body containing the gene exist, but it is very
difficult to credit a gene's "awareness" of money since there seems
nothing intrinsically "human" about the latter.
Nevertheless, it presumably could be contended that there are
those whose sexual character, perhaps genetically signalled, is indis-
criminately promiscuous. Their nature incites them to engage in
frequent and casual sexual encounters and to have no particular
46. Bode, supra note 45, at 22. See also Bell, The Chinese Challenge, 29 HAiv. L. SCH.
BuLL. 14-15 (Spring, 1978).
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concern about who their partners are. It is the act that counts, not
with whom it is done. Therefore, literally, anyone will do. If so, if
this disposition is naturally present and inextricable, then it makes
sense to get paid for indulging it. That is, it makes sense to become
a prostitute - for why not be paid, while you are having fun. And,
since the promiscuous impulse is fundamentally embedded in the
personality, it is presumptuous to "judge" it and attempt to treat
it, for no amount of "treatment" will succeed in eradicating it.
One possible response refuses to acknowledge that such a syn-
drome is a healthy natural configuration and does classify it as a
disease (nymphomania, for example) likely produced by environ-
mental circumstances which can be countervailed or diminished in
influence. However, even if it is granted, by hypothesis, that a
promiscuous impulse can indeed derive from a congenitally im-
planted code, the proportion of the cases of prostitution so ac-
counted for must be meager. Thus even if there are some persons
irredeemably actuated to prostitution there remains the overwhelm-
ing proportion of prostitutes who can and will want to reject "the
life" if they are but reached in the right way.
Another argument in behalf of relaxing efforts to control prostitu-
tion stems from what might be termed its "social service" facet.
Prostitutes offer . . . men variety and an opportunity for sex-
ual experiences in which only the man's needs matter. In the
context of prostitution he can indulge these needs in ways that
he cannot or will not with his regular partners. The skillful
prostitute creates a fantasy world in which repressed desires
can be acted out in safety, and may thus function as a parapro-
fessional sex therapist. (footnotes omitted)"
The elaboration of this view suggests that accessibility to such an
outlet diverts and absorbs male energies and impulses which, if not
so deflected, might well erupt in negative, threatening and socially
disruptive actions and modes.
The quick rejoinder notes that an institution "in which only the
man's needs matter" may be heaven for the man, but hell for the
woman. Should one human being be entitled to salvation at the
expense of another's damnation and domination? As for the claim
that prostitution acts as a reservoir into which is poured much en-
ergy of socially harmful potential, it can be asked, what price is
47. Jennings, supra note 4, at 1251.
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society entitled to extract from many particular individuals in be-
half of indulging self-interested precautions? In other words, how
much individual degradation can be glibly rationalized in the cause
of sanctifying the order that is? How much exploitation of some is
defensible, or tolerable, in pursuit of the ease, stability and protec-
tion of others? Indeed, it has been suggested that the exploiters are
themselves exploited: "[prostitution is] the extreme form of a rela-
tionship in which the members are interested only in exploiting each
other.""
This last characterization intimates a more powerful counter ar-
gument to the assertion that prostitution should exist to provide
sexual release and satisfaction not otherwise attainable by many
men. This more forceful riposte observes simply that, if it is indeed
true that prostitution affords many men what they need but cannot
otherwise obtain, a very damaging indictment of society is thereby
made out. Society is then admonished to cease trying to evade the
implications of such a critique by encouraging the maintenance of
a subjugated and degraded group to handle a problem of human
organization it should solve with greater humaness, dignity, and
effectiveness.
Such an indictment is most sharply and concisely put by Dr. Karl
Menninger in the introduction he wrote to the American publication
of the Wolfenden Report: "Prostitution . . . exist[s] illegally to
provide relief for physical and emotional tensions which, in theory,
could and should find other outlets .... " The sexual and emo-
tional satisfaction that may be being provided by prostitutes should
be available from sexual relations not dependent on one of the part-
ners being an object or commodity exploited by the other. "In a
theoretically good society, where sexual fulfillment ought to be as
possible as other kinds of personal satisfaction no one would be a
prostitute or a client." 50
It is the responsibility of a social order to the citizens who consti-
tute it to provide an environment where urgent fundamental needs
can be accommodated satisfyingly and harmoniously without signif-
icant numbers of individuals being injured and degraded.The exist-
ence of prostitution is society's admission that it has thus far de-
faulted on this responsibility. "The continuance of prostitution
48. Id.
49. WOLPENDEN REPowr, supra note 14.
50. WINICK & KINSIE, supra note 6, at 15.
Vol. 17: 355
Victims Without Crime
today suggests that society has yet to develop institutions consonant
with its values which can satisfy the needs prostitution satisfies."',
It is perverse for society to point to its own default as reason for
perpetuation of that default's emiserating consequences through
prostitution.
A transformation, through education and therapy, of constricting
and crippling attitudes about sexuality is a methodology of infi-
nitely greater dignity and perspicacity by which to provide neces-
sary satisfaction for all, than is furnishing surreptitious access to
fulfillment for some at the expense of exploiting and degrading oth-
ers.
Perhaps someday a truly free atmosphere will enable every-
one to explore his sexuality fully with unpaid partners. The
range of emotional meanings which people can project on to sex
acts will be recognized and appreciated. People will enjoy the
variety and complexity of each other's sexual fantasies instead
of being frightened by them. No one will feel guilty for enjoying
any sexual practice that gives him pleasure.52
CONCLUSION
It has been argued that efforts toward decriminalizing prostitu-
tion are misguided insofar as they concede the inevitability of a
class of citizens who will be prostitutes. In its responsibility to be a
mechanism for more harmoniously arranging human affairs, im-
proving the human condition, and "emancipating" human beings,
the law should retain jurisdiction over those engaging in activities
of prostitution. It should do so as a means of requiring persons
convicted of participating in such activities to undergo a
rehabilitation-therapy-training program designed to re-orient their
self-images and life styles so that they would no longer wish to
prostitute themselves. This approach may be helpful attitudinally,
as well as practically, in minimizing the ravages of prostitution until
its deep seated objective social causes can be extirpated from the
life of the community.
51. M. STEmIN, LovERs, FRIENDS, SLAVES 2 (1974).
52. Id. at 371.
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